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FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
FOR E-MAIL THREATS: ARE THERE
ANY FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS?
JOSHUA AZRIELt

I.

INTRODUCTION

E-mail use is as common today as sending letters and packages
through the Postal Service. According to an October 2003 study, nearly
117 million Americans use e-mail on a daily basis.' Worldwide there are
about 30 billion e-mails sent per day.2 While e-mail can often be an effective way of communicating with friends, family, and business colleagues, it can also be used as a means to threaten someone's life or plan
a violent crime against an unwitting third party. Often, threatening emails are directed toward someone, and the victim can report the threats
to the police. These online threats are known as cyber-stalking. 3 A 1999
study by the U.S. Justice Department states that women are twice as
likely as men to be victims of stalking by strangers and eight times as
4
likely to be victims of stalking by intimates.
According to the Justice Department's report, the definition of cyberstalking includes two people using an implied threat when they exchange several private e-mails in which they discuss kidnapping an unnamed individual and harming them at some generic time in the future. 5
Is this type of communication legal? What if the exchanged e-mails discussed a violent and sexual fantasy about a neighbor, co-worker, or classt Joshua Azriel is a 3rd year Ph. D Student at the University of Florida. His research and scholarship focuses on the Internet and related First Amendment controversies.
Mr. Azriel has a Master of Arts in Political Science from the University of Florida and has
worked as a broadcast journalist.
1. Pew Internet Project, Spam: How it is hurting e-mail and degrading life on the
Internet, http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPSpamReport.pdf (accessed Feb. 13, 2005).
2. Id.
3. U.S. Attorney General, Report on Cyberstalking:A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (accessed
Feb. 13, 2005)
4. Id.
5. Id.
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mate but the "victim" never knew about these messages? Is this form of
speech protected by the First Amendment?
In late 1994 and January 1995, a University of Michigan student,
Jake Baker, and an acquaintance in Canada traded several e-mails
about sexual and violent fantasies they had about women. 6 One of the emails included a violent fantasy about one of Baker's female classmates.
The e-mail was also posted on an Internet bulletin board. 7 Baker's female classmate, the subject of the violent fantasy, never knew about the
e-mails until Baker was indicted.8 The e-mails became the focus of two
widely publicized trials in Michigan. 9 Baker was eventually found not
guilty in both. 10 The cases discussed several different possible interpretations of federal threat laws."
The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided a case where the victim's
fear mandates that threatening speech lose its First Amendment protection. 12 The Court, in a 6-3 decision, ruled that cross burning is not protected speech when it is used to intimidate an individual or a group of
people. 13 The salient part of the Court's ruling is that intimidation is a
true threat, and a prohibition on intimidating threats protects people
from a fear of violence.' 4 The Court stated that the speaker does not
actually have to carry out the threat for it to be illegal. 1 5 This follows the
reasoning of several lower court decisions that use a reasonable person
16
standard to determine the efficacy of a threat.
Several court cases at the U.S. district and circuit levels have dealt
with Internet and e-mail threats.' 7 However, to date no cases involving
Internet related hate speech or e-mails have made their way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Many of the cases in the lower courts' 8 have relied on
federal statute to prohibit threats in interstate communications.1 9 This
article will examine the application of this statute within the context of
6.
7.
8.
9.
1997).
10.

U.S. v. Alkhabaz, 104 F. 3d 1492, 1493 (6th. Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 1507.
U.S. v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), affd, 104 F. 3d 1492 (6th Cir.
Id.

11. Id.
12. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 552.
15. Id.
16. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492; Rollins v. CardinalStritch U., 626 N.W. 2d 464 (2001);
U.S. v. Newell, 309 F. 3d 396 (2002); Planned Parenthoodof Columbia/ Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 875 (LEXIS 2005).
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several threat cases. It will determine whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, especially in light of Virginia v. Black, 20 properly decided the Baker case. In Part II, the article will then review three
seminal hate speech cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court delineated
under what circumstances speech may be restricted. 2 1 Part II will also
include a review of the Internet-based PlannedParenthoodof Columbia/
Willamette case. 22 Part III will discuss and review the federal antithreat statute and its application to online communications. 2 3 In Part
24
IV, this article will explore three e-mail threat cases.
Part V will then apply the holding from the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Virginia v. Black to the facts from the Baker case. Part VI,
the Conclusion, will answer the question of whether e-mail hate speech/
threats, such as that in the Baker case, should be considered free speech
protected under the First Amendment.
II.

U.S. SUPREME COURT AND HATE SPEECH

One of the seminal court cases involving hate speech is Brandenburg
v. Ohio. 25 The U.S. Supreme Court overturned an Ohio law that punished advocating violence as a means of political change. 2 6 In Brandenburg, an Ohio Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted under a state statute
that punished advocating violence as a means of political change. 27 In a
per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that the First Amendment does not
permit a state to forbid advocacy of the use of force, except where the
advocacy is directed to 'imminent incitement.' 28 The mere teaching of
resorting to violence as a means of political change does not equal actu29
ally preparing a group for violent action.
According to Brandenburg, any hate speech statute must distinguish between the concept of advocacy and the actual preparation for
violence. 30 The only time speech may be limited is if violence is
31
imminent.
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
20. Black, 538 U.S. 343.
21. Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); R.A.V. v. St. Paul,505 U.S.
377 (1992); Black, 538 U.S. 343.
22. Planned Parenthood,290 F.3d 1058.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 875.
24. Baker, 890 F. Supp 1375; Newell, 309 F. 3d 396; Rollins, 626 N.W. 2d 464.
25. 395 U.S. 444.
26. Id at 445.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 447.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 448.
31. Id.
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violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
32
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
The four-part Brandenburg test is the basis for determining the constitutionality of speech that advocates violence. 3 3 In the first part of the
test, advocacy, words inform an audience about the speaker's hopes and
beliefs. 34 They can be linked with statements about the reason for the
advocacy. 3 5 In Brandenburg, the Court defined advocacy as the "mere
abstract teaching" of political reform. 36 The Court said this type of
37
speech is legal.
38
The second part of the Brandenburgtest is direction to incitement.
This is speech that goes beyond mere advocacy. 3 9 If the defendant is
only aware that his words will incite illegal action but does not have the
incitement in mind as his purpose, his speech is protected.4 0 If the
speaker knows his words will likely trigger an illegal action, then the
41
speech is not protected.
The third part of the test is imminence. 4 2 This is at the heart of
Brandenburg. It means a very short period of time just before the violence occurs or, more specifically, "violence occurring nearly immediately
43
after the actual spoken words or the speech's conclusion."
The final part of the Brandenburgtest is the likelihood of illegal action. 4 4 When illegal action takes place, there are few if any free speech
controversies. 4 5 If speech leads to violence, then it is the direct result of
46
the third part of the test, imminence.
The Court's 1992 decision, R.A.V. v. St. Paul,4 7 was one of its most
complicated cases involving hate speech and incitement. A St. Paul,
Minnesota statute did not include a restriction against "fighting words"
or "breach of peace," but it prohibited the display of symbols and words
48
that aroused anger on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.
32. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.

Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 449.

42. Id. at 449.
43. Id. at 434.
44. Id. at 447.

45. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 434.
46. Id. at 449.
47. 505 U.S. 377.
48. Id. at 380.
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The Court struck down the St. Paul ordinance because it prohibited
speech solely on the basis of the subject the speech addressed. 49 According to the Court, other subjects such as sexual orientation, occupation,
and political affiliation could have been legal targets of hate speech. 50
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that the First Amendment
did not permit the government to impose special prohibitions, or contentbased restrictions, on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. 5 1 In the Court's ruling, Scalia mentioned threats, stating that they
are outside of the scope of First Amendment protection because we need
to be able to protect individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened
52
violence will occur.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided a third case involving hate
speech. 53 In an 8 to 1 decision, the Court outlawed the burning of a cross
when it is done with an intention to intimidate. 54 In Virginia v. Black,
the Court said it is legal to ban conduct, such as burning a cross, but not
to ban the expression or ideas associated with the act. 5 5 It overturned
the part of the Virginia state statute declaring that all burning of crosses
is automatically a form of intimidation. 56 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated that a prohibition on true threats protects individu57
als from the fear of violence and the ensuing disruption to their lives.
Justice O'Connor's opinion defined a true threat as "those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group
of individuals."5 8 In Virginia, the Court pointed out that the speaker
does not need to actually carry out the threat for the speech to be illegal. 5 9 It said that intimidation is a threat when a speaker intends to
place a person or group of people in fear of bodily harm or death. 60
What Brandenburg,R.A.V., and Virginia have in common is a focus
on when speech is no longer permissible based on imminence and a real
fear of violence. In each case the Court was concerned with protecting
people from a danger. Similar logic was applied in a U.S. appeals court
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 388.
Black, 538 U.S. 343.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 359.
Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
Id. at 360.

850

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIII

61
case involving Internet hate speech.
In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc, ruled that the anti-abortion Web site, the Nuremburg Files, constituted a threat towards four Oregon abortion providers. 6 2 The
Nuremburg Files Web site was supported by a pro-life group, the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA). 63 It had listed the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of over 200 people including pro-choice
judges, politicians, and abortion providers. 6 4 Each abortion provider's
name was listed in black meaning they were alive or in gray meaning
they had been wounded. 65 Murdered doctors had a slash running
66
through their names.
The four Oregon doctors who brought the suit in 1997 feared for
their lives after their names appeared on the Web site and on a GUILT
poster. 67 One of the doctors, Warren Hern, interpreted the posters and
Web site to mean, "Do what we tell you to do, or we will kill you. And
they do." 68 Another plaintiff, Dr. James Newhall, said he was "severely
frightened" because every time there was a WANTED poster aimed at an
individual that person was subsequently murdered. 69 Newhall was
70
afraid he was the next to die.

In ruling that the Web site was threatening speech and therefore
7
unconstitutional, the appeals court focused on the Brandenburg test. '
The court ruled that had ACLA generically endorsed violence committed
by others against abortion providers that endorsement alone may have
been protected speech, but naming specific doctors crossed the Brandenburg line. 72 The Court stated, "It is not necessary that the defendant
intend to, or be able to carry out his threat; the only intent requirement
for a true threat is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate[d] the threat."7 3 The court stated that the test for incitement
61. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d 1058.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1080 (explaining that the goal of the Web site was "collecting dossiers on
abortionists in anticipation that one day we may be able to hold them on trial for crimes
against humanity"). The Web site stated its name was based on the war crimes trial from
World War II. Id.
64. Id. at 1065.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1065.
67. The GUILT posters were paper-based listings of abortion providers. ACLA sponsored both the posters and Nuremburg Files Web site. Id.
68. PlannedParenthood, 290 F.3d at 1066.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
72. PlannedParenthood, 290 F.3d at 1072.
73. Id. at 1075.
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is whether the listener takes seriously the communication as an "intent
to inflict bodily harm."7 4 This distinguishes a true threat from speech
75
that is merely "frightening."
III.

FEDERAL THREAT STATUTE

U.S. law prohibits any attempt to threaten or extort someone
through interstate communications. 76 Specifically, it punishes someone
who threatens to kidnap or injure another person using any interstate
communications system. 7 7 In order to prosecute the offense of transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce in violation of
875(c), the government does not need to prove that the defendant in78
tended his communication be received as a threat.
It is not necessary for defendants to have the intent to carry out the
threat in order for them to be found guilty. 7 9 The threat itself is a
crime. 8 0 The government only needs to prove that the defendant intentionally transmitted a communication where a reasonable person familiar with the context of the communication would interpret it as a true
threat. 8 Finally, 875(c) has also been interpreted to mean that a specific individual target does not need to be identified in the threat in order
82
to support a conviction.
There are two often-cited court cases where 875(c) has been applied
74. Id. at 1076.
75. Id.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 875.
77. Id. § 875 (c) states, "Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person
of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
78. See U.S. v. Whiffen, 121 F. 3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding the lower court's decision that the defendant's statements were true threats and a reasonable jury would have
found the defendant's statements to be taken as threats by the intended victim). The court
also ruled that 875 (c) is a general intent crime. Id.; see also 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threats §21 (1994).
79. See U.S. v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming that it is sufficient
that the threat be made regardless of the subjective intention of the defendant). A reasonable person would interpret a threat as an intent to commit bodily harm and the communication is meant to achieve that goal. Id.; see also 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Extortion, Blackmail, and
Threats § 51 (1994).
80. Id.
81. See U.S. v. Francis, 164 F. 3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the notion that the
government's burden of proof is that "the defendant intentionally transmitted a communication in interstate commerce and that the circumstances were such that an ordinary, reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the communication would interpret it as a
true threat of injury").
82. See U.S. v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1992) (extending a provision in 18 U.S.C.
§ 876, the federal law against using the Postal Service to mail messages threatening to
kidnap, extort, or injure someone, and stating that the target does not need to be specifically identified).

852

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIII

and interpreted broadly. 8 3 In U.S. v. Kelner,8 4 Russell Kelner was convicted in 1974 for threatening Palestine Liberation Organization leader
Yassir Arafat on television.8 5 Kelner was convicted under 875(c) notwithstanding his claim that he and his organization, the Jewish Defense
86
League, did not have any specific plans to carry out an assassination.
In upholding the district court's decision, Judge Oakes stated that
broadcasting a threat to an indefinite and unknown audience is a communication of a threat.8 7 Judge Oakes wrote that broadcast television is
a legitimate means of communication sufficient to violate the statute because he did not believe Congress would have "left such a gaping hole in
its statutory prohibition against the communication of threats in commerce."8 8 That "hole" would otherwise allow any would-be assailant to
avoid prosecution.8 9
The judge stated that under 875(c) it was not necessary for the government to prove that an appellant had a specific intent or an ability to
carry out his threat.90 The government proved that Kelner "intended to
communicate a threat of injury through means reasonably adapted to
that purpose." 9 1 The court said that threatening utterances are criminal
92
under the statute, not the specifics of the intent to carry out the threat.
Judge Oakes wrote that the government has a duty to protect people
from threats:
As part of the Government's constitutional responsibility to insure domestic tranquility, it is properly concerned - in an era of ever increasing
acts of violence and terrorism, coupled with technological opportunities
to carry out threats of injury - with prohibiting as criminal conduct specific threats of physical injury to others .... 93
In U.S. v. DeAndino,9 4 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned the 1990 exoneration of Jean Pierre DeAndino who was
found not guilty in district court for threatening to kill Nelson Baker. 9 5
83. U.S. v. Kelner, 534 F. 2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976); U.S. v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146
(1992).
84. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1021. In an interview on WPIX, when asked by reporter, John Miller, "Are
you saying that you plan to kill them [Arafat and his lieutenants]?" Miller answered, "We
are planning to assassinate Mr Arafat. Just as if any other mur-just the way any other
murderer is treated."
87. Id. at 1023.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Kelner, 534 F. 2d at 1025.
93. Id. at 1026.
94. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (1992).
95. Id. at 147.
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DeAndino was convicted under 875(c) for telling Baker he was "going to
blow his brains out" and "going to die."9 6 In overturning the lower
court's verdict, the appeals court stated that a specific intent is not
needed for words to be considered a threat. 9 7 General intent satisfied
the court because 875(c) "does not expressly require a heightened mental
element in regard to communication containing a threat."9 8
The court in DeAndino ruled that the government must establish
that a true threat is made under circumstances where a reasonable person would perceive the statement as a threat.9 9 It also noted that the
mental state of the defendant is not a factor in the statute's wording:
[T] here is nothing in the language of the statute or legislative history to
indicate that Congress intended that there be a heightened mens rea
requirement in regard to the threat element or to indicate that the prosecution has to prove a specific
intent to threaten based on the defen10 0
dant's subjective purpose.
The important part of the appeals court ruling is that it disagreed
with the district court's conclusion that 875(c) requires specific intent for
conviction. 10 ' In most cases involving 875(c) the courts try to identify
both the actus reus and mens rea to determine if an individual has broken the law.' 0 2 The actus reus is defined as performing an illegal act
voluntarily, and the mens rea is when the crime is committed with the
appropriate state of mind.' 0 3 With threats, the actus reus is a communication with intent to kill or injure.' 0 4 David Potter contends the actus
reus comes directly from the statute because it states "any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure
the person of another." 10 5 While 875(c) does not contain an explicit mens
rea, Potter states most courts have held that the defendant must knowingly or intentionally transmit the communication containing the
threat. 106
As it relates to the Internet and e-mail, the statute's language is
broad enough to apply to these online communications.' 0 7 Potter be96. Id. at 147.
97. Id. at 147-49.
98. Id. at 148-49.

99. Id. at 149 (citing U.S. v. Hoffman).

100. Id.
101.
102.
B.U. L.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 148.
David C. Potter, Note: The Jake Baker Case: True Threats and New Technology, 79
Rev. 783 (1999).
Black's Law Dictionary37 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999).
Potter, supra n. 102, at 785.
Potter, supra n. 102, at 784.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 802.
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lieves that e-mails fall into the category of interstate commerce. 10 8
Messages are usually routed through an Internet Service Provider
("ISP") that is often located in a different state, even if the message is
directed to a recipient in the same state. 10 9
IV.

E-MAIL THREAT COURT CASES

For about three months between November 1994 and January 1995,
University of Michigan student Jake Baker and his acquaintance, Arthur Gonda (living somewhere in Ontario, Canada), exchanged e-mail
messages in which the content expressed a sexual interest in violence
against women and girls. 110 On June 9, 1995 Baker posted a story on an
Internet news group, "alt.sex.stories,"' 1 1 describing the torture, rape,
and murder of a young woman who had the same name as one of Baker's
classmates. 112 The government charged Baker with one count of unspecified threatening communications transmitted in interstate and foreign
commerce from December 2, 1994 through January 9, 1995.113 The
charge was based on the posted story. 1 14 On March 15, 1995, the government then charged Baker and Gonda in a superseding indictment with
five counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 1 5 These five counts focused
1 16
on the e-mails.
Citing the Kelner decision, Judge Cohn dismissed the charges
against Baker:
Statements expressing musings, considerations of what it would be like
to kidnap or injure someone, or desires to kidnap or injure someone,
however unsavory, are not constitutionally actionable under § 875(c)
absent some expression of an intent to commit the injury or kidnapping.
In addition, while the statement need not identify a specific individual
as its target, it must be sufficiently specific as to its potential
target or
1 17
targets to render the statement more than hypothetical.
Judge Cohn distinguished Baker's statements from those of Russell
Kelner's, noting that Kelner publicly said he was planning on murdering
Arafat. 118 The Judge emphasized that the e-mails were private commu108. Id.
109. Jennifer Star, Note: E-mail Harassment- Available Remedies and Proposed Solution 39 Brandeis L.J. 317, 330 (2000).
110. Baker, 890 F. Supp 1375.
111. Id. at 1379.
112. Id. (the court records refer to the female student as "Jane Doe" in order to protect
her identity).
113. Id. at 1380,
114. Id. at 1379.
115. Id,
116. Id. at 1378.
117. Id. at 1386.
118. Id.
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nications between Baker and Gonda and there was little, if any chance
that they would have been made public. 119 The messages became public
120
only because of the trial.
The government appealed the decision and brought the case to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 12 1 The appeals court upheld
the lower court's ruling, but did so using a three-part test from the statute. First, 875(c) requires transmission in interstate or foreign commerce; secondly, the communication must contain a threat; and finally,
the threat must be to injure or kidnap an individual.1 22The court stated
the government satisfied the first and third parts of the test, but not the
second - an actual threatening communication. 1 23 The court pointed to
the DeAndino requirement that the law only requires a general threat
12 4
and ruled that an e-mail communication did not satisfy.
The court ruled that in order for a communication to be deemed a
threat, a reasonable person would have to take the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm and perceive the
expression as being communicated to effect some change or achieve some
goal through intimidation.' 25 Judge Cohn stated that any communication must have the purpose of a violent goal:
Although it may offend our sensibilities, a communication objectively
indicating a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm
cannot constitute a threat unless the communication also is conveyed
for the purpose
of furthering some goal through the use of
1 26
intimidation.
The court did not believe that the e-mails exchanged between Baker
and Gonda were meant to effect violent action(s) or to achieve a goal of
intimidation. 127 Rather the e-mails were an attempt to foster an online
128
friendship based on sexual fantasies.
In the court's 2-1 ruling, Judge Robert Krupansky dissented. 1 29 In
his dissent, Judge Krupansky pointed out that Baker and Gonda discussed implementing a plan to abduct, rape, and murder a young woman. 130 He referred to the DeAndino case citing that 875(c) does not
119. Baker, 890 F. Supp at 1386.
120. Id. at 1390.
121. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493 (Alkhabaz and Baker are the same person).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 875.
123. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494.
124. Id. at 1495.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1496.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1498. The following e-mail exchange between Baker and Gonda shows
an illegal plan of action:
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confine the scope of criminalized communications to those only directed
towards identifiable individuals and intended to effect some violent goal:
"a simple, credible declaration of an intention to cause injury to some
person, made for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever, may also con13 1
stitute a threat."
Judge Krupansky embraced the DeAndino principle that a reasonable person's interpretation of intent towards harm could be the test to
determine if a message equaled a threat.1 32 According to DeAndino,
whether the originator of the message intended to intimidate or coerce
anyone becomes irrelevant.1 3 3 Judge Krupansky interpreted Baker's email as plotting a violent harm towards a female he knew (either a classmate or neighbor), and therefore, a specific target of violence is not
needed to convict.13 4 The judge reminded the rest of the court that, at a
minimum, Baker and Gonda had agreed to meet and try to implement
13 5
their conspiracy on an unwitting female victim.
The district and appeals court decisions have been widely criticized. 13 6 Attorney Melanie Persellin agreed with Judge Krupansky's assessment that a threat can be made against an identifiable category of
people without singling out individuals. 13 7 Persellin analyzed this case
from the context that 875(c) requires proof that the Internet stories and
e-mails were interstate transmissions and contained a threat to injure or
kidnap someone. 138 She disagrees with the appeals court's interpretation that the e-mails about torturing and raping women did not have any
true threat elements. 1 3 9 Persellin argues that if the Alkhabaz court had
I can't wait to see you in person. I've been trying to think of a secluded spot. but my
area knowledge of Ann Arbor is mostly limited to the campus. I don't want any blood in my
room, though I have come up with an excellent method to abduct a bitch. As I said before,
my room is right across from the girl's bathroom. Wait until late at night. grab her when
she goes to unlock the door. Knock her unconscious. and put her into one of those portable
lockers (forget the word for it). or even a duffle bag. Then hurry her out to the car and take
her away.. .What do you think?
Gonda replies:
I think that it is best to disconnect yourself as much as possible from the crime. The
police, would surely come around asking questions... leaving with a huge bag may look
very suspicious to anyone who might see you.. .A dorm may be too populated for an abduction... also, it would be better to go for complete strangers. [sic] Id.
131. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1502 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1502.
133. DeAndino, 958 F.2d, 148.
134. Id. at 1504.
135. Id. at 1507.
136. Melanie Pearl Persellin, Notes and Comments: Sticks and Stones May Break My
Bones, But Your Words Are Sure to Kill Me: A CaseNote on U. S. v. Alkhabaz, 50 DePaul L.
Rev. 993 (2001).
137. Id. at 1019.
138. Id. at 1020.
139. Id.
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correctly applied the facts from the DeAndino case, it would have used a
reasonable person test to determine that Baker's statements were intended to harm someone.140
David Potter disagreed with the appeals court ruling based on the
Kelner decision. 14 1 While the district court found that Baker's communications fell short of being an "equivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific threat," he points out that in Kelner that appeals court upheld
the threat conviction even though Kelner's threats to Arafat were not
immediate in nature. 142 It would have been impossible for Kelner to
carry out an assassination attempt without delay once the threat was
broadcast. 143 Potter argues that 875(c) literally refers to any communication containing any threat to injure or kidnap not just a threatening
communication aimed at affecting a specific goal.14 He believes that the
e-mails, which discussed a generic plan to find a woman, injure her, and
kidnap her, should have been sufficient enough to secure a conviction
145
under 875(c).
While the Baker e-mails have been the subject of numerous debates
on interpreting 875(c), there are two other cases involving the use of email as threats. 146 In 2002 in U.S. v. Newell, the U.S. Court of Appeals
147
for the Sixth Circuit upheld a lower court's conviction based on 875(c).
Tommy Newell was convicted of threatening Cynthia Hamden, a married woman with whom he had an affair from December 1999 until August 2000.148 When the relationship ended, Newell sent her harassing
and threatening e-mails. 149 Between August 13, 2000 and September
11, 2000 he sent over 70 e-mails and left 26 threatening messages on her
home telephone answering machine. 150 Hamden, who lived in Monroe
County, Michigan, contacted the sheriffs department.' 5 ' They in turn
contacted Newell who lived in Utah and warned him to discontinue the
140. Id. at 1024.
141. Potter, supra n. 102, at 797.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 798.
145. Id. at 804.
146. See generally, Newell, 309 F.3d 396; Rollins, 626 N.W. 2d 464.
147. Newell, 309 F.3d 396.
148. Id. at 397.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 397-98. An example of one of the 70 e-mails is from August 13, 2000:
I WILL NOT BE DISTRESPECTED LIKE THIS... I TRIED TO DO THIS YOUR
WAY, BUT YOUR WAY HURTS TOO MUCH, I TAKE ALL THE PAIN WHILE
YOU AND RICH HAVE FUN, WELL STARTING TOMORROW THE RULES
ARE GOING TO CHANGE, BECAUSE I WILL NOT GO OUT LIKE THIS. NO
FUCKING WAY.
151. Id. at 398.
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messages. 15 2 Newell continued to make threatening calls to Hamden,
15 3
and was again contacted by the Monroe County Sheriffs Department.
5
4
He subsequently stopped sending harassing messages.'
On September
29, 2000, FBI agents arrested him in Ogden, Utah, and they charged him
with a one-count indictment for transmitting threatening interstate communications in violation of 875(c). 155 On October 12, 2000, in the Eastern District Court of Michigan, Newell pled guilty, but appealed the
sentencing.156 Before his sentencing, Newell was told he would get
twelve to eighteen months in prison, but, instead, he received twenty
157
seven to thirty three months.
The appeals court affirmed the punishment stating that the prison
sentence was appropriate in light of the 'circumstances. The court noted,
"both the purchase of the handgun in close temporal proximity to the
making of the threats, and the tone communicated by the threats them58
selves, constitute conduct evidencing intent to carry out the threats."
Judge Marbley stated that Newell's threats contained explicit language
including an intention to kill Hamden's husband. 1 59 Judge Marbley
stated the 'sentence was appropriate 'for a violation of the 875(c)
160
statute.
A second case involving threatening e-mails is Rollins v. Cardinal
Stritch University.16 1 While this case does not involve an 875(c) violation, it parallels the Baker case in that it involves unwanted e-mails toward a female classmate at a university. 16 2 On October 27, 1999, Bruce
Rollins, a student at Cardinal Stritch University in Edina, Minnesota,
sent an unsolicited message to a female classmate with an image of kissing lips and the subject title, "FOR THE MEN (OR WOMEN) IN YOUR
LIFE."16 3 The female classmate forwarded the message to her class instructor stating that she did not know why Rollins sent her the message,
but that Rollins gave her "the creeps" from his use of off color remarks to
64
her during class.'
In January 2000, Rollins continued sending more unsolicited e-mails
to his classmates including the woman who made the initial com152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 398.
Newell, 309 F.3d at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.
Newell, 309 F.3d at 401.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
626 N.W. 2d 464 (Minn. 2001).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 466.
Id.
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plaint. 165 Included in one of his e-mails was a forwarded message about
the verdict in the Baker case without a direct message from Rollins himself.1 6 6 The e-mail was forwarded to the University's Interim Dean of
Students who, in turn, suspended Rollins. 167 At a disciplinary hearing,
the Dean told Rollins he could stay if he had no in-person or e-mail contact with the female classmate.' 6 8 Rollins sued the school challenging
the student disciplinary proceeding as a violation of the university's
handbook. 16 9 He alleged that the hearing, and his suspension, were arbitrary and without due process. 170 Siding with the university, The
Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld the verdict of the Hennepin
171
County District Court.
Both courts agreed that the university was within its rights to suspend Rollins based on the repeated complaints of the unwanted emails. 172 While Rollins did not focus on 875(c) for the cause of action, it
did uphold the interpretation many courts have given that statute. More
specifically, the court gave validity to the notion that the University's
action was proper because the victim interpreted Rollins' e-mails as
threatening. The messages engendered fear in the recipient, fear which
a reasonable person, in this case, the university's Interim Dean of Students, would also interpret as threatening.
V. ARE E-MAIL THREATS PROTECTED SPEECH?
What the preceding cases demonstrate is that it is illegal to not only
threaten someone, but vague threats may not be constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. Interpretations of 875(c) range from
defining the threat from the victim's point of view 173 to the reasonable
person's standard. 1 74 U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Brandenburg,
R.A.V., and Virginia all illustrate the limits to free speech when the
prospect of violence is imminent or has a demonstrable effect on the intended victim. 1 7 5 Other cases such as DeAndino, Kelner, and Newell also
examined threats from the victim's point of view and applied a reasona176
ble person standard, even when the threats weren't specific in nature.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id. at 467.
Rollins, 626 N.W.2d at 467.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 471.
Id.
See Kelner, 534 F. 2d 1020.
See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492.
See Black, 538 U.S. 343; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; R.A.V, 505 U.S. 377.
Kelner,534 F. 2d 1020; Newell, 309 F.3d 396; DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146.
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In light of the aforementioned cases, the facts of Baker would lead an
observer to predict that the Baker court would have applied a similar
standard. However, that court declined similar reasoning, and characterized the e-mails as private exchanges between two people. 17 7 The
content of Jake Baker's and Arthur Gonda's e-mails indicate a generic
goal of finding a young woman and violently and sexually abusing
her. 178 It is arguable that those e-mails were in the realm of protected
speech as the court held, but once the messages began discussing one of
Baker's classmates, there was an identifiable person at risk. Perhaps
the e-mails were simply fictional fantasy stories, but when a real person
who lives in close proximity to one of the authors is the subject, can the
law take that chance?
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black would answer that question in the negative. The Court specifically pointed out
that the speaker does not have to actually carry out the threat for it to be
illegal.179 A prohibition on true threats "protects individuals from the
fear of violence" and from the disruption that fear engenders." 8 0 Restricting Jake Baker's e-mail would have protected "Jane Doe" from fearing for her life had she ever found out about the messages. She was the
target of a violent fantasy story that was posted in an Internet chat site,
a forum where literally anyone in the world, including someone in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, could have located her.' 8
Even if Jake Baker may not have had any plans to kidnap and abuse
Jane Doe, Arthur Gonda or an anonymous visitor to "alt.sex.stories"
could have taken an initiative against the female student. Baker put her
safety and well being at risk. If he had wanted his stories to be fictional,
he should have used a pseudonym for Jane Doe's identity. His putting
her life at risk is no different than what ACLA did with the Nuremburg
Files Web site, posting the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
over 200 doctors, judges, and politicians. 18 2 Once their names were
made public, their lives had changed. The four Oregon doctors received
84
threats.' 8 3 They needed police protection and wore bulletproof vests.'
In light of these examples, the courts seem inclined to rule that
when a third party's life may be in jeopardy from a threatening statement, that speech has crossed beyond the bounds of First Amendment
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
Id. at 1495.
Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
Id.
Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375.
PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1065.
Id. at 1086.
Id.
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protection.18 5 The Kelner, DeAndino, Planned Parenthood,and Virginia
courts reach the same conclusion but arrive there in different ways. The
Baker case seems to be an anomaly in that it was decided differently.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article's findings indicate that the e-mails in the Baker case
would not be protected speech today in light of the Court's ruling in Virginia v. Black. It does not matter what technological means are used to
convey the threats. The Kelner, DeAndino, Newell, and Planned
Parenthoodcases all show that the threats themselves were the salient
factors in the courts' decisions. The courts focused on the dangers the
threats imposed on the victims.
The different courts agreed that when victims fear for their lives and
their lives are disrupted because of a threat, then First Amendment protection is lost.' 8 6 In the Baker case, Jane Doe's life was placed at risk
when her name was posted in connection with being the subject of a violent sexual story.'8 7 Even before the Virginia case, several appeals
courts used the reasonable person standard to determine the constitutionality of ambiguous threats. Virginia simply narrowed the test to include the victim's safety.
185. See Kelner, 534 F. 2d 1020; DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146; PlannedParenthood290 F.3d
1058; Black 538 U.S. 343.
186. See e.g. Planned Parenthood,290 F.3d 1058.
187. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492.
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